Bylaws

A Delaware Court of Chancery decision in Siegel v. Morse reaffirmed that courts will not entertain challenges to advance notice bylaws absent an actual, existing dispute. Even after the Delaware Supreme Court’s Kellner decision raised the bar for facial validity claims, the plaintiff attempted to reframe his challenge as an “as-applied” one, but the court found no ripe controversy since no stockholder had expressed an intent to nominate directors. The decision signals that bylaw litigation must be grounded in a real, concrete controversy and that generic concerns about defensive board behavior are insufficient without an active proxy contest or nomination dispute.

Many Delaware-incorporated companies include provisions in their corporate charters or bylaws requiring that stockholder lawsuits be brought in Delaware’s Court of Chancery — a court that decides cases before a judge, with no jury. This creates a tension with California law, which strongly guarantees the right to a jury trial and has a broad “long arm” statute that can pull disputes into California courts even when a company has chosen a different forum. A minority stockholder who was a California resident sued EpicentRX (a Delaware corporation) in California court. The lower courts refused to enforce the Delaware forum selection clause, reasoning that sending the case to Delaware would effectively strip the plaintiff of her California jury trial rights. The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that a forum selection clause is not unenforceable simply because it requires parties to litigate in a jurisdiction that does not provide the same jury trial right as California. The court reasoned that California’s strong public policy favoring jury trials applies to proceedings in California courts, not to courts in other states. It further reasoned that a forum selection clause determines where a dispute is litigated, not how, so it does not constitute a prohibited waiver of jury trial rights. The decision aligns California with the majority of states that enforce Delaware forum selection clauses, reinforcing the ability of Delaware-incorporated companies to channel stockholder disputes to Delaware’s specialized corporate court.

The Delaware Court of Chancery recently provided a powerful reminder of the Court’s equitable purpose, and how it will not countenance bad faith or duplicity. In Ghatty v. Mudili et al., three board members of a five-member board voted at a special board meeting to remove the remaining two directors from their officer positions, and later sued under 8 Del. C. § 225 to seek confirmation that the two directors had been validly removed from their officer roles. The Defendants challenged their removal on a number of grounds. The Court of Chancery considered one argument dispositive: that the meeting notice was inherently deficient because the meeting agenda omitted the removal action effectuated at the meeting, and indeed misleadingly suggested that one Defendant’s officer role would be expanded. The Court condemned the notice as “duplicity,” voided the vote, and held that the Defendants remained officers of the Company.

The Meeting Notice

The stated purpose of the meeting was to discuss how to bring “better governance and transparency” to the Company, and the agenda included the following items:

• Review of requests for financial statements, bank records, and supporting documentation;
• Discussion of alleged unauthorized transactions or approvals;
• Proposal for new signatory protocols and centralized finance email;
• Proposed recognition and role expansion for one of the Defendants; and
• Any additional matters raised by board members or shareholders in good faith.

Following the notice, there were additional communications amongst the directors detailing the items for discussion at the meeting. Notably, the removal of the Defendants as officers was never mentioned. In fact, although one Plaintiff director raised certain “potential areas of concern,” he specifically said that the meeting notice was not “an accusation of wrongdoing against any individual,” but was instead “a formal invitation to clarify and remedy any potential governance shortfalls,” and he invited the directors to “submit any ‘contrary evidence’ and ‘additional agenda items’ ahead of the meeting.” He also mentioned one Defendant’s “notable contributions,” and proposed that he be appointed Chief Revenue Officer and given enhanced compensation.

Before the board meeting, however, there was a “falling out” between that director and the Defendants. The latter then said that they would be unable to attend the meeting due to their “tight schedules.” The meeting went forward as planned, with only the three Plaintiff directors in attendance. Later resolutions state that, at the meeting, the three Plaintiff directors removed the Defendants as officers of the Company.

The Court found that the meeting notice technically complied with the Company’s bylaws, but nevertheless voided the vote taken at the meeting because the notice was not equitable. Instead, the Court considered it a “bait and switch that concealed the Plaintiffs’ intention to remove [the Defendants] as officers.” In holding that the Defendants remained officers of the Company, the Court stressed that “[e]quity will not abide such duplicity toward fellow directors.” The Court also rejected the argument that notice was not required where the targeted directors lacked the power to block the action, stressing that “[f]air notice fosters a genuine deliberative process – a purpose that was subverted here.”

Lessons Learned

Ghatty offers some important lessons about the value of good governance when taking board action:

• Directors are entitled to a “fair and non-misleading notice of the agenda for a special meeting,” even if the notice technically complies with the bylaws. When drafting agendas, consider whether the agenda adequately describes the discussion points and decision items for the meeting.
• Holding Regular Meetings. This meeting was the Company’s first in-person board meeting in three years. This fact was relevant to the determination of whether the meeting was a “regular” or “special” meeting. That distinction can be significant, particularly in instances where the company’s bylaws have different notice requirements for regular versus special board meetings.
• Clear Bylaws. The Court began its analysis by turning to the Company’s bylaws. In support of their argument that the meeting notice was deficient, the Defendants cited to a stockholder meeting provision in the bylaws that required a specific statement of the meeting’s purpose. Because the bylaws lacked an analog requirement for board meetings, the Court found that the notice was technically sufficient, and had to rely instead on its equitable power to reach its result. Consider whether there are unintentional gaps or inconsistencies in your company’s bylaws that can be clarified or corrected to provide more certainty and consistency across governance items. Also remember that bylaws set the rules for the game, but, as seen in Ghatty, can’t protect against bad faith.
• Records and Meeting Minutes. The Court referenced the fact that there were no contemporaneous minutes or evidence of the meeting, only a resolution dated a couple of weeks later stating that, at the meeting, “appropriate resolutions were adopted, changing certain officer and signatory roles within the Company.” Although the Court did not rely on this fact in its holding, it is a helpful reminder of the importance of appropriately and timely documenting actions taken at a meeting.

On April 29, 2026, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of consolidated stockholder challenges to advance notice bylaws that The AES Corporation and Owens Corning each adopted in 2023. Advance notice bylaws are the internal rules setting out how far in advance, and with what disclosures, a stockholder must tell a company it intends to nominate directors or bring business before a meeting. The stockholders attacked the provisions in the abstract, without anyone having actually attempted a nomination and been turned away.

The court held that this was not enough to proceed. Delaware courts will review these provisions when there is a concrete, live dispute about how a bylaw is being applied, not when the alleged harm depends on future events that have not occurred. The decision continues a consistent line of recent bylaw rulings and means such provisions generally will not be tested in court until a real nomination dispute arises.

Whether a company is gearing up for an acquisition, a growth equity financing, or an IPO, a due diligence review will be an inevitable part of that transaction, and that review will test not only the current business but also the integrity of a company’s historical records. Readiness for that review is critical, as once a diligence process begins, gaps in corporate approvals, equity records, contract management, intellectual property ownership, and regulatory compliance can quickly become leverage for purchase price adjustments, closing conditions, and/or special indemnities. At best, diligence gaps can consume management attention at a time when a company has little bandwidth to spare. At worst, they can detract from a company’s credibility and can have a meaningful impact on deal speed and certainty. Most issues are fixable, but the available solutions often narrow after a deal is already on the table. This article provides an overview of actionable steps leadership at mid- to late-stage private companies can take to make transaction readiness an ongoing discipline rather than a pre-signing scramble.

Set Up and Maintain a Virtual Data Room

Rather than waiting until a letter of intent is signed, companies should stand up and maintain a virtual data room (VDR) early, using records they already keep locally, and treat it as a living repository of critical corporate documents. Management teams that prepare to address anticipated diligence focus areas and maintain organized virtual records early are better positioned when a process launches than teams that start flat-footed. Companies can get a head start by asking outside counsel for a standard due diligence request list, which serves as an organizational and gap-identification tool, as well as an organized table of contents for their VDR. This ensures that documents are comprehensive and indexed by categories prospective investors and acquirers will expect.

The VDR should contain current, fully executed, and dated documents together with all amendments, statements of work, and side letters. Superseded and terminated agreements should be archived, not deleted or mixed with operative versions. One small but time-saving step in setting up a VDR is using a consistent and intuitive naming convention as documents are uploaded, which will help not only management but also third-party reviewers quickly navigate the VDR’s contents. Once a diligence process begins, access should be staged and subject to tiered permissions, with additional controls for competitively sensitive information, compensation data, and litigation files; privileged materials should be withheld or handled through a process designed to preserve privilege. Particularly when a potential buyer is a competitor, or when the underlying material is subject to confidentiality restrictions that do not permit sharing with a potential acquirer or investor, counsel should advise prior to upload and contemplate redactions, clean-team arrangements, and restrictions on downloading or printing. When in doubt, leave it out; it is easier to pause early and evaluate permissions and other protections than to pull back a document after it has been shared.

A word of caution: prospective investors now run AI review tools that can scan an entire data room in minutes, and while that process can generate false positives, it can also magnify every internal inconsistency across the VDR, including in the cap table, contracts, and other materials. As a best practice, keeping the VDR updated quarterly helps identify issues early and positions the company and management to earn credibility from the moment that transaction diligence begins.

Maintain a Corporate Record Book and Organizational Documents

M&A buyers and growth equity investors will expect clean and current corporate governance records. This means prospective investors will review: current versions of the certificate of incorporation (including all amendments) and bylaws; board and stockholder minutes; and fully executed, dated written consents. An improperly compiled consent with a missing signature page or date can cost the company meaningful time and resources to track down or, worse, require corrective action to cure. Every material corporate action should tie out to a corresponding board and/or stockholder approval, including equity issuances, option grants, director and officer elections, and subsidiary formations.

Companies should also at least annually confirm good standing in their state of incorporation and in every jurisdiction in which they are qualified to do business. Outside counsel can obtain verbal good standing confirmations from third-party service providers, often for a nominal or no cost to the company. Good standing lapses can trigger fees, taxes, and penalties and, in many states, can bar the company from bringing suit in local courts until the lapse is cured, although a lapse does not typically invalidate contracts executed while the company was not in good standing. For an additional layer of caution, companies can consider ordering lien and litigation searches from third-party service providers in the same set of jurisdictions.

Ensure Vigilant Capitalization Table Hygiene

The company should expect buyers or investors to request a current copy of the capitalization table and, in the case of an equity financing, a pro forma cap table reflecting the completed round. Most cap table hygiene issues exist well before a contemplated transaction and surface in the diligence process. Common hiccups include unsigned option grants, undocumented stock issuances, unrecorded convertible note draws, and inconsistencies between vesting schedules and employment terms. Cap table accuracy is key: a company’s representations about its capitalization are often treated as fundamental representations, giving buyers or investors the ability to claim breach even for minor discrepancies. Moreover, a messy cap table can be perceived as poor ownership discipline by the company or its management.

With assistance from outside counsel, the company should reconcile the cap table against the stock ledger and equity grant documentation, ensuring that every stock and option issuance is supported by board resolutions, grant agreements, evidence of payment of the exercise or purchase price, and, if applicable, an approved, unexpired equity incentive plan. Each option grant should also be supported by a current 409A valuation that supports the board’s determination of the fair market value of the underlying shares.

Importantly, companies should develop a clear understanding of how antidilution provisions operate and how change-of-control acceleration clauses (single-trigger and double-trigger) may affect the equity/distribution waterfall in a transaction. Modeling these scenarios in advance allows management to communicate the deal economics clearly to all stockholders and avoids last-minute surprises that can derail negotiations.

Understand Key Provisions in Material Contracts

Counsel for buyers and investors will expect the opportunity to review each contract that is material to the business. These typically include: contracts with key customers and suppliers above certain revenue or expense thresholds; license agreements; leases; employment and severance agreements with key personnel; and other contracts that are important to the business. These contracts often contain change-of-control consent triggers, rights of first refusal, out-licensing restrictions, most favored nation provisions, exclusivity, non-solicit, non-compete, and other restrictive covenants. In certain circumstances, a counterparty may have a notice, consent, or termination right in connection with a transaction. Accordingly, with the help of outside counsel, a company should be generally aware of which key agreements contain those provisions and should have a plan for obtaining consents or providing timely notice in advance of entering into a transaction process. Seeking consent late in the process can give leverage to the counterparty, which can increase overall costs and decrease deal certainty.

Confirm Intellectual Property Ownership and Assignment of IP

Depending on the company’s core business, clean IP title is often a significant driver of the diligence process. One consideration that comes up time and again is whether every founder, employee, and contractor who contributed to the company’s IP portfolio has executed an invention assignment agreement that assigns all intellectual property rights to the company. It isn’t uncommon for advisors and early contributors in early-stage companies, often compensated in equity, to miss the assignment paperwork altogether, or to execute, but not date, the assignment. Any gaps in assignment should be addressed ahead of the buyer or investor diligence process, which can be done with the help of outside IP counsel. Companies should also routinely conduct an audit of open-source software usage to confirm compliance with applicable license terms.

Maintain Compliance with Industry-Specific Regulatory Requirements

Companies operating in regulated industries, such as healthcare, financial services, energy, and government contracting, should confirm that all material licenses, permits, and registrations are current and in good standing. Identifying regulatory approvals or notices that would be required in connection with a change-of-control or assignment of a license can avoid an additional layer of investor diligence caused when gaps are identified later in the deal negotiation process. Regulatory non-compliance discovered during diligence can significantly delay closing or reduce deal certainty.

Texas overhauled its business organizations code last year through Senate Bill 29, part of a broader effort to make the state a more attractive home for companies looking beyond Delaware. One of the changes lets certain corporations, including publicly traded ones and other opt-in companies with more than 500 shareholders, adopt a bylaw requiring a shareholder to hold at least 3% of the company’s stock before bringing a lawsuit on the company’s behalf against its own directors or officers.

A federal court has now applied that provision, dismissing a derivative case against Southwest Airlines’ board because the plaintiff held far too little stock to clear the company’s 3% bylaw. The court also rejected the argument that a pre-suit demand letter sent before the new rules took effect counted as starting the proceeding. For companies weighing where to incorporate, the case is an early signal that Texas courts are giving the state’s new corporate litigation protections real effect.